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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Bharath Kumar Nachenahalli Bhuthegowda 
 
Master of Science 
 
Department of Computer and Information Science 
 
September 2018 
 
Title: Methods for Analyzing the Evolution of Email Spam 
 
 
Email spam has steadily grown and has become a major problem for users, email 
service providers, and many other organizations. Many adversarial methods have been 
proposed to combat spam and various studies have been made on the evolution of email 
spam, by finding evolution patterns and trends based on historical spam data and by 
incorporating spam filters. In this thesis, we try to understand the evolution of email spam 
and how we can build better classifiers that will remain effective against adaptive 
adversaries like spammers. We compare various methods for analyzing the evolution of 
spam emails by incorporating spam filters along with a spam dataset. We explore the trends 
based on the weights of the features learned by the classifiers and the accuracies of the 
classifiers trained and tested in different settings. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the 
classifier trained in adversarial settings on synthetic data. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Spam can be defined as unsolicited or unrelated contents sent to users in large 
numbers. They are most commonly associated with emails as email spam which are also 
called junk mails or unsolicited bulk emails (UBE) or unsolicited commercial emails 
(UCE) (Wikipedia contributors, 2018a). They are also associated with other domains like 
instant messaging, social network, blogs, forums, etc. They may be sent with commercial 
intent or with criminal intent. A large number of spam emails contain disguised links 
which could lead to phishing and fraudulent websites. They also increase network traffic 
and consume storage space. Email spam has steadily grown in the past couple of decades 
and has become a major problem for users, email service providers, and many other 
organizations.  
Many studies have been made on the evolution of spam, by finding evolution 
patterns and trends based on historical spam data (Wang, Irani, & Pu, 2013) and by 
incorporating spam filters (Guerra, et al., 2010). As the spammers continually try to 
evade the spam filters and spam filters upgrade themselves to block the spam, it has 
become a never-ending race between spammers and the spam filters. Since the nature of 
spam emails is affected by evolving spam filters, it makes more sense when spam 
datasets are analyzed along with the filters. 
In this thesis, we try to understand the evolution of email spam and how we can 
build better classifiers that will remain effective against adaptive adversaries. We 
compare and analyze different methods by incorporating spam filters along with spams to 
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identify and explain trends in email spam. Here we view the spam filter as a binary 
classifier, which classifies emails into spam and non-spam. 
The datasets used in this work are SPAM Archive (Guenter, 2018) and the Enron 
dataset (Klimt & Yang, 2004). SPAM Archive is an excellent source of spam emails 
which are collected by Bruce Guenter using honey-pot addresses from early 1998. In this 
thesis, we use emails collected from 2000 to 2016 as email spams. The Enron dataset was 
collected and prepared by the CALO Project (A Cognitive Assistant that Learns and 
Organizes). We have used Enron dataset as non-spam emails. The classifier is trained on 
these datasets with different settings. We then explore the trends based on the weights of 
the features learned by the classifier. We also compare the accuracies of the classifiers 
trained and tested in various settings. Inspired by the adversarial techniques proposed 
(Dalvi, Domingos, Sanghai, & Verma, 2004), we evaluate the effectiveness of the 
classifier trained in adversarial settings on synthetic data. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND: DEFINITIONS AND TOOLKITS 
This chapter briefly covers the various definitions, techniques, and toolkits that 
are used in this thesis. 
2.1 Logistic Regression 
 Logistic regression is a statistical model widely used for binary classification. It 
uses a logistic function (a sigmoid function) at the core of the method. The method 
involves estimating the parameters of the logistic model, which in turn predicts the log-
odds of the probability of an event as a function of a linear combination of independent 
variables also called features. The outcome is often labeled as ‘0’ and ‘1’ which can also 
represent spam/non-spam, pass/fail etc. (Wikipedia contributors, 2018b) 
2.2 SciPy 
 SciPy (Jones, Oliphant, Peterson, & others, 2001) is an open source Python 
framework for mathematics, science, and engineering. It includes many popular packages 
like NumPy, Matplotlib, Scikit-Learn, Pandas, Ipython etc. In this thesis, we have utilized 
some of these packages including Scikit-Learn (Pedregosa, et al., 2011), Matplotlib 
(Hunter, 2007) and pandas (McKinney, 2010) extensively for its experiments. The Scikit-
Learn library contains efficient implementations of various machine learning algorithms 
and provides high-level APIs to access them (Buitinck, et al., 2013). Matplotlib is used to 
generate high-quality graphs. Pandas is used for data wrangling. 
2.3 Data Preprocessing 
 One of the important and early steps to be performed during data mining is to 
prepare the data before feeding it to an algorithm. It is a technique of transforming raw 
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data into a clean dataset. It involves formatting, cleaning, and sampling of data which are 
explained in detail below. 
2.3.1 Data Formatting 
 The data available can be in various formats like tables in relational databases, 
HTML files, binary files, JSON files etc. Hence it is required to format the available data 
into suitable formats to work with. 
2.3.2 Data Cleaning 
 Depending on the dataset to be worked on, data cleaning involves various tasks 
like removal or fixing of missing data, removal of HTML tags, removal of stop words, 
anonymizing or removal of certain attributes containing sensitive information. 
2.3.3 Data Sampling 
 Depending upon the availabilities of quality/quantity of data, computational and 
memory resources, data needs to be sampled. For example, when the available data is 
larger than needed, or when the available resources cannot handle the huge amount of 
data, a smaller representative sample of it can be considered. Also, when the data is 
biased, for example, if the dataset contains a large number of spam emails but few non-
spam emails, spam emails can be sampled to match the size of non-spam emails. 
2.4 Data Transformation 
 Depending on the data to be worked on and the algorithm that is used, data should 
be transformed so that the algorithm can accept valid input and perform well. Some of the 
common transformations applied to the data are scaling, decomposition, and aggregation. 
When the features are numerical, some algorithms are sensitive to the range of values 
different features can take. In such cases, the data must be normalized. Some data 
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represent complex concepts which can be hard to make use of when used directly by the 
algorithms. These data will be more useful when decomposed into constituent parts. For 
example, text data in an email can be vectorized using the bag-of-words model and then 
this vectorized data can be fed to the algorithm. The bag-of-words model is explained 
later in detail. Sometimes multiple features can be aggregated into a single feature which 
can be more relevant for an algorithm. 
2.5 Data Tokenization 
 Data tokenization is a technique of breaking up a sequence of characters into 
small pieces such as words, phrases, sentences or other elements. These small pieces are 
called tokens. Some of the common heuristics used to break the sequence include 
breaking on white spaces, punctuation characters or newline characters. During the 
process, characters like punctuation marks and white spaces are removed. 
Many libraries and tools are available to achieve this process. In this thesis, we 
use the library provided in Python by NLTK (Bird, Klein, & Loper, 2009) for tokenizing. 
2.6 Bag-of-Words Model 
 Bag-of-words model is a representation of text data in vectorized form by 
considering the text as a bag (multiset) of words. In this model, grammar and word order 
are ignored keeping only the occurrence of the words. The two common ways of storing 
the representation in this model are term frequency representation where the frequency of 
occurrences of each word is stored, and the other way is storing only a Boolean flag 
indicating whether the word is present or not without considering the number of times it 
appears in the text. 
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But this representation could suffer from the lack of quality in the information by 
the presence of common words like articles and prepositions. The words that are very 
common and occur very frequently are called stop words and these words need to be 
removed to improve the quality. 
Since the bag-of-words model ignores word orders, that is only the count of words 
matters, to capture spatial information within the text, n-grams are used. An n-gram is a 
contiguous sequence of n items like words, letters, syllables from a given sample of text. 
When n=2, it is called a bigram model. For example, a sentence like “Jack goes to college 
every day” in bigram can be represented as [“Jack goes”, “goes to”, “to college”, “college 
every”, “every day”]. 
2.7 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
 Following are the metrics that are used for evaluation and comparison in this 
research. 
2.7.1 Confusion matrix 
 A confusion matrix, also known as the error matrix, is a table used to visualize the 
performance of the classification model on a set of test data for which the actual values 
are known. Some of the common terms used to describe confusion matrix are 
True Positives (TP): Number of instances that are predicted positives and are actually 
positives. 
False Positives (FP): Number of instances that are predicted positives but are actually 
negatives. 
True Negatives (TN): Number of instances that are predicted negatives and are actually 
negatives. 
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False Negatives (FN): Number of instances that are predicted negatives but are actually 
positives. 
A typical confusion matrix in table layout is shown in Table 2.1 
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False Positives 
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False Negatives 
 
True Negatives 
Table 1. Confusion Matrix 
2.7.2 Accuracy 
Accuracy of a classification model is given by below formula 
Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN) 
2.7.3 False Positive Rates (FPR) and False Negative Rates (FNR) 
 False positive rate is the proportion of actual negatives that yields positive test 
outcomes and is given by the formula below 
FPR = FP / (FP+TN) 
False negative rate is the proportion of actual positives that yields negative test 
outcomes and is given by the formula below 
FNR = FN / (FN+TP) 
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CHAPTER III 
RELATED WORK 
 With the increase in spam content on the internet, much research has been done 
and new techniques have been proposed to combat against them. Some of the early 
efforts in automatic spam detection using machine learning techniques include Bayesian 
network classifiers (Friedman, Geiger, & Goldszmidt, 1997), naïve Bayesian approach 
(Sahami, Dumais, Heckerman, & Horvitz, 1998) and others. Many publications like 
(Dalvi et al., 2004), (Chinavle, Kolari, Oates, & Finin, 2009), (Biggio, Fumera, & Roli, 
2009) employing adversarial strategies have been published. There have also been studies 
made on the evolution of email spam, like (Guerra, et al., 2010) and (D. Wang et al., 
2013). The works which are closest to this research are (Dalvi et al., 2004), (D. Wang et 
al., 2013) and (Guerra, et al., 2010). 
 (Dalvi et al., 2004) formalizes the problem of adversaries adapting to classifiers to 
produce false negatives. They have used the naive Bayes classifier and extend its 
functionality to tackle the adversary. (D. Wang et al., 2013) explained the dynamic nature 
of spam emails by exploring the statistical ways of analyzing the evolution of email 
spam. They have used topic modeling algorithms on the contents of emails to investigate 
topic drift and they have also performed network analysis. Again, (Guerra, et al., 2010) 
studied the evolution of spam by incorporating spam filters along with the spam dataset. 
They explored the dynamic nature of spam emails by analyzing the change in rule sets of 
different releases of SpamAssassin, an open source spam filter, on testing with datasets. 
They have also explored the ways to cluster the spam messages according to filters’ view. 
 9 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data Preparation 
Firstly, we show the overview of the dataset used in our research by introducing 
SPAM Archive and ERON datasets. The SPAM Archive dataset is an excellent source of 
email spam and is collected by Bruce Guenter since early 1998. The website updates the 
dataset with monthly releases of new email spam. In this research, we have used the 
email spam collected from the year 2000 to 2016. Figure 1 shows a plot of number of 
emails received in each year. We can see that the number of spam emails is less from the 
year 2000 to 2005. Since the dataset covers spam emails collected for sixteen years, we 
get more insights on the evolution of email spam over these years. 
 
Figure 1. Spam counts in different years collected by SPAM Archive 
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 The Enron dataset is a source for non-spam emails. It was collected and prepared 
by the CALO Project (A Cognitive Assistant that Learns and Organizes). The dataset 
contains emails from about 150 users, mostly senior management of Enron. The corpus 
contains around 19088 emails. 
 Both the datasets provide raw emails stored in flat files organized into folders. In 
this research, we consider only the text content of the emails, ignoring the headers and 
other multipart contents. In addition to the text contents, we add hour of the day and day 
of the week when the emails were received as additional features. We have used the 
email library provided in Python to parse and extract contents from raw email. 
4.2 Data Transformation 
Once the contents are extracted from the emails, it is required to convert the text 
content of the emails into a feature vectors which can be fed to a machine learning 
algorithm. To achieve this, we use CountVectorizer API provided by Scikit-Learn. In the 
process of this conversion, we remove stop words in addition to some of the extra words 
which cause bias while training. These extra words cause bias while training the model 
and hence are removed. We also ignore the words which appear less frequently in the 
mail. In the process, we also consider using bigrams as features. So, the vocabulary of the 
features includes single words and bigrams. To reduce the training time, we store the 
vocabularies obtained by CountVectorizer. 
4.3 Logistic Regression 
Once we have feature vectors ready, we use the logistic regression API provided 
by SciKit-Learn to train the model and test its accuracies. We use default values for the 
parameters that the logistic regression API offers, although we tried using different 
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solvers and penalties. We consider default values as they gave better accuracies 
compared to other settings. 
Now we describe the different settings that were used to compare the trends. 
4.4 Models Trained On A Yearly Basis 
 In this experiment, the spam dataset is divided into sixteen datasets according to 
the year they belong. Sixteen new datasets are created by appending the non-spam dataset 
from Enron to each of the spam datasets. We split these datasets into train and test 
datasets. Logistic Regression classifiers are created by training on each of the train 
datasets separately. Each of these classifiers is tested on datasets from other years. 
Accuracies of each of the models are then plotted. This will give us the insights on how 
the performance of models trained on one year varies when tested on different years. For 
example, this shows how the classifier trained on the year 2000 dataset would perform on 
future emails over the period of time. 
4.5 Model Trained On All Years 
 In this experiment, we try to analyze the performance of the classifier which is 
trained on email samples from all the years. This model is tested against each of the years 
and the accuracies are plotted. We can compare the accuracy of this model with a model 
trained on a single year. 
4.6 Feature Comparison 
 Once the classifiers are trained, we can extract the weights of the features from 
them. The weight of a feature represents its influence in categorizing the email as spam or 
non-spam. The features with positive weights contribute for an email to be classified as 
spam and those with negative weights contribute for the email to be classified as non-
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spam. We extract the top features contributing towards spam and non-spam from each of 
the trained models and compare how significant they are in other years. For example, if 
we extract the top 10 features from the model trained in the year 2000 which contribute 
towards the spammy nature of an email, we can analyze where they stand and how their 
weights change over the years. We also try to group similar features to compare the group 
composition of the top 100 features over the years. This gives us insights on which group 
of features dominates and how they change over the years. 
4.7 Robust Classifier 
 In this section, we describe how to build a better classifier that will remain 
effective against adaptive adversaries. This approach is inspired by the adversarial 
technique proposed by Dalvi et al. We assume that the spammers have complete 
knowledge of the classifier and they try to evade the filters by adding or removing or 
replacing some of the features in the emails. In order to capture the effort put by the 
spammers to evade the filters, these actions are associated with a cost. Finding the right 
cost for a particular action on a feature could be tricky. For example, the cost of replacing 
a keyword that sells the spammer’s product will be higher than that for the other words. 
Since it can be subjective, to keep it simple, we assign a random cost varying between 
[1,3] to each of these actions on different features. Also, we assign a total budget for the 
spammer to achieve his goal. This makes sure that the spammer will not try to modify the 
email excessively. In this experiment, we have set the total budget to modify an email to 
10. The spammer tries to achieve the goal of evading filter by incurring a minimum loss. 
Some of the heuristics to achieve this are by adding the features with the least weight to 
cost ratio or removing the features with the highest weight to cost ratio. 
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Thus, with this idea, we build a classifier which adapts to the adversary by 
training itself on the predicted adversarial data. We have the following experiment setup. 
At first, we sample 15270 emails, which is equal to the number of emails in non-spam 
dataset, from all years spam dataset. These emails are then combined with non-spam 
dataset to get a total of 30540 emails and again split into ten different equal sized 
datasets. Each of these ten datasets has nonoverlapping spam and non-spam emails. The 
training and adversary actions happen in an iterative fashion over these datasets. Figure 2 
gives a visual description of the datasets used in the experiment. Initially, we have the 
datasets from D1 to D10. Once we train the classifier on D1, we get a classifier C1. The 
adversary now has complete knowledge of C1. Using that information, the adversary now 
attacks the dataset D2 to create D2¹. We record the accuracy of C1 on D2¹. This 
completes one iteration. Now we have multiple options to update our classifier. We can 
include either or both of D2 and D2¹, inclusive or exclusive of the previous dataset (i.e. 
D1) as the training dataset for the next iteration from which we get a new classifier C2. 
This process is carried on in the further iterations. Later we compare the performance of 
the classifiers C1 to C9. Since we have assumed random values for the costs, we repeat 
this experiment multiple times with different costs and different datasets and take the 
average of the performances. 
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Figure 2. View of datasets used in adversary classification  
 15 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes and analyzes the results obtained for the experiments 
conducted in the previous section. 
5.1 Models Trained On A Yearly Basis 
 As described in the previous chapter, classifiers are trained with datasets from 
each year and are tested on datasets from other years and performance graphs are plotted. 
Since the number of graphs generated is large, we describe only a few here, namely the 
performance of the models that were trained on the years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. 
 Figure 3 shows the accuracy of the classifier trained on a dataset from the year 
2000 over different years. As we can see, the accuracy has dropped rapidly after 2001 
and has remained almost constant over further years. The reason for this behavior can be 
due to fewer data in the training dataset. As we can see from Figure 1 from Chapter 4, the 
number of spam emails collected in 2000 is much less compared to that of later years. 
The other explanation could be the drastic change in the features used in spam emails 
over the years from that of features used in the year 2000. 
 Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 show the accuracies of the classifiers trained on 
datasets from the years 2005, 2010, 2015 respectively over different years. The graphs 
show similar variation in the accuracies for all these models and all these models have 
quite high accuracies over all years. This could be due to the presence of common 
features in all these years and large training datasets. 
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Figure 3. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from the year 2000 
 on different years 
 
Figure 4. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from the year 2005 
 on different years 
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Figure 5. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from the year 2010 
 on different years 
 
Figure 6. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from the year 2015 
 on different years 
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5.2 Model Trained On All Years 
 In this section, we analyze the performance of the model trained on email samples 
from all the years. Email samples from each year have been taken and tested multiple 
times. Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows the graphs of the model trained on different runs with 
different samples. The two figures vary in the ways the emails are sampled from the 
dataset. In Figure 7, the dataset is created by sampling a minimum of size of the dataset 
and 30000 emails from each year dataset. In Figure 8, the dataset is created by sampling 
25 percent of emails from each year dataset. We can see that models from both Figure 7 
and Figure 8 have better performance than the models trained with a dataset of a single 
year as shown in the previous section. The slight decrease in the accuracy for the years 
2000-2002 in Figure 8 compared to that in Figure 7 is due to fewer email samples taken 
from these years. 
 
Figure 7. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from all years 
 on different years (Trial 1) 
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Figure 8. The accuracy of the model trained on a dataset from all years 
 on different years (Trial 2) 
5.3 Feature Comparison 
 Firstly, we show how the weights of the top 10 features contributing towards 
spam and non-spam nature of emails have changed over the time. By top 10, we mean the 
features with most negative weights and most positive weights. The features with 
negative weights contribute towards non-spam nature of the emails while the features 
with positive weights contribute towards spam nature of the emails. Again, since the 
number graphs generated is large in number we show some of the interesting ones. 
5.3.1 Trends in non-spam features 
In this section, we discuss the top 10 non-spam features. As we can see in Figure 
9 and Figure 12, the top 10 features include a day of the week and hour of the day. As the 
non-spam dataset is the same for all the models, the lower weights of these features 
signify that spam emails were not received or less frequently received during those days 
 20 
of week and hours of the day. Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 13 show that features that 
appear commonly in business communications have lower weight, thus contributing 
towards non-spam nature of the emails. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features in the month of March 
2000. 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features in the month of March 
2001. 
 
 21 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features in the month of March 
2014. 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features in the month of March 
2015. 
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features in the month of March 
2016. 
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5.3.2 Trends in spam features 
 In this section, we discuss the top 10 spam features. As we can see in Figure 14 
and Figure 15, the usage of words like ‘Viagra’, ‘free’ and ‘money’ are dominant during 
the years 2000 and 2001 but they diminish in later years. Figure 16 and Figure 17 shows 
that features like ‘shift_jis’, ‘ads’, ‘ru’ have higher weights and thus contributing towards 
spam nature of the emails. ‘Shift jis’ is a character encoding for the Japanese language 
which indicates that these emails are most probably sent from Japan. Also, the presence 
of feature ‘ru’ indicates that the emails could contain links or URLs containing Russian 
domain name. Overall, in the recent years, spammers have tried to evade filters by 
introducing different character encoding in the spam content. 
 
Figure 14. Comparison of weights of the top 10 spam features in the month of  
June 2000. 
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Figure 15. Comparison of weights of the top 10 spam features in the month of  
June 2001. 
 
 
Figure 16. Comparison of weights of the top 10 spam features in the month of  
June 2015. 
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Figure 17. Comparison of weights of the top 10 spam features in the month of  
June 2016. 
5.3.3 Trends from a model trained on all years 
In this section, we analyze the trends of the features obtained in the model trained 
on datasets from all years. Figure 18 shows the comparison of the top 10 spam features. 
We can see that most of the features are character encodings. This indicates that 
spammers might have started using encodings as a new way to evade the filters or it 
could be an artifact of using Enron dataset as non-spam dataset, as the dataset was 
collected during 2000-2001 which could lack the usage of encodings. Figure 19 shows 
the comparison of the top 10 non-spam features which includes features that are 
commonly used in business communications. The presence of features like “dave” and 
“daren” in the the top-10 non-spam words is probably due to the nature of the Enron 
dataset, and this would not be the case in most datasets. 
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Figure 18. Comparison of weights of the top 10 spam features of all year model. 
 
Figure 19. Comparison of weights of the top 10 non-spam features of all year model. 
5.3.4 Analysis of group composition 
 After extracting the top features from the model, we have manually labeled each 
feature in some of the known categories. These categories include dictionary words, non-
dictionary words, medical words, encodings, timestamp, domain names, and vulgarity 
words. 
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In the Figure 20 and Figure 21 we can see that during 2000 and 2001, though the 
number of vulgarity and medical terms in emails were low, they were the top features 
with high average weights. In the Figure 22 and Figure 23 we can see that during 2015 
and 2016, the domain names and encodings were the top features with high average 
weights. 
 
Figure 20. Feature composition of the model trained on a dataset from June 2000. 
 
Figure 21. Feature composition of the model trained on a dataset from June 2001. 
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Figure 22. Feature composition of the model trained on a dataset from June 2015. 
 
 
Figure 23. Feature composition of the model trained on a dataset from June 2016. 
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5.3.5 Performance of model trained in adversarial settings 
 In this section, we show the performance of the model trained in the adversarial 
settings. We capture the performance of the model by keeping the false positive rate 
fixed. We achieve a fixed false positive rate by modifying the decision boundary of the 
classifier. We do multiple experiments by varying the false positive rate, the total budget 
available for the spammer, and the cost vector. These experiments are repeated with 500 
different datasets and the performance is averaged. 
 Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26 show the performance of the model when 
trained with the fixed false positive rate of 0.03 and a total budget of 10, 15 and 20 
respectively. In this experiment, the adversarial action is performed by removing the 
highest weight to cost ratio words. As we can see, the model trained cumulatively on the 
adversarial datasets (Yellow) performs the best in all the scenarios with the model trained 
cumulatively on both adversarial and non-adversarial dataset (Black) close to it. The 
performance of the model trained non-cumulatively on the non-adversarial datasets (Red) 
is poor and remains constant. The performance of the model trained cumulatively on the 
non-adversarial datasets (Blue) decreases gradually as it is unaware of the adversarial 
attacks made by the spammers. The performance of model trained non-cumulatively on 
the adversarial dataset (Green) depends on the total budget available for the spammer. 
When the total budget is less (=10), it performs poorly compared to (Green). But the 
performance gets better when the total budget is increased (=20). The overall 
performance of all the models decreases with the increase in total budget. Similar trends 
can be seen when these models are tested by keeping FPR=0.05 as shown in Figure 27, 
Figure 28 and Figure 29. 
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Figure 24. Performance of model with FPR=0.03 and Total Budget=10. 
 
Figure 25. Performance of model with FPR=0.03 and Total Budget=15. 
 
 
Figure 26. Performance of model with FPR=0.03 and Total Budget=20. 
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Figure 27. Performance of model with FPR=0.05 and Total Budget=10. 
 
Figure 28. Performance of model with FPR=0.05 and Total Budget=15. 
 
 
Figure 29. Performance of model with FPR=0.05 and Total Budget=20. 
 Further, Figure 30 and Figure 31 shows the performance of the models trained 
with the adversarial addition of features. As we can see all the three models (Blue, 
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Yellow, Black) have similar performances. But the other two models (Red and Green) 
perform poorly. 
 
Figure 30. Performance of model (addition) with FPR=0.03 and Total Budget=10. 
 
Figure 31. Performance of model (addition) with FPR=0.03 and Total Budget=100. 
 From the above experiments, we can see that the performance of the models 
trained on the adversarial datasets is better than those which are trained only on non-
adversarial datasets. Although these experiments are tested using random cost vectors on 
synthetic data, the results are quite impressive. With sophisticated and well-estimated 
cost vectors, the models can perform better on real data. When the assumption of an 
adversary having complete knowledge of the classifier does not hold, the performance 
could be questionable. In that case, it appears that the model trained on both adversarial 
and non-adversarial datasets could perform well.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 We have explored various methods to analyze the trends of the features that 
depict the evolution of email spam. In the beginning, we discussed the performance 
variations of the model trained on a single year when tested on different years. We saw 
that the performance of the model trained on the dataset for the year 2000 decreased 
steeply which indicates a significant change in spam features over the years. 
Performances of the models trained on later years were quite high over a wide range of 
years which indicates the presence of common features. We also compared the accuracies 
of the model trained on all years which had better performance than any of the former 
models. 
Further, we discussed how the weights of the features can be used to find the 
trends in the features over time. We saw that non-spam features in most of the models 
were the words used in usual business communications. We then observed a shift in the 
weights of the spam features over the time. The features which were significant in the 
early years were gradually replaced by new words. We also categorized the top features 
to see the categorical drift in the features over time. We also saw that vulgar and medical 
terms were common features in the early years, while the contents with new encodings 
were very common in the later years. This indicates spammers are trying to evade filters 
with new encodings. 
Finally, we built a better classifier that will remain effective against the adaptive 
adversaries. The model assumes that the adversary has complete knowledge of the 
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classifier and the adversary can attack the classifier by the addition or removal of 
features. When the model is trained in such adversarial settings, the performance is 
improved. 
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